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SOVEREIGN DEBT SYMPOSIUM
Inter-Creditor Equity in Corporate and
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Broadly defined, inter-creditor equity represents a normative evaluation of the treatment
a debtor accords to a certain creditor (or group of creditors) vis a vis the treatment that
the debtor’s other creditors have received.  In the context of domestic insolvency laws,
this evaluation is made possible (and enforceable) through detailed priority structures
designed to favor certain creditor groups over other.  When the debtor is sovereign,
however, creditor priorities are only subject to an informal and arguably loose order
developed through the practice of sovereign debt restructuring.  As Anna Gelpern notes
in the special edition of the Yale Journal of International Law on sovereign debt, “The
modular sovereign debt restructuring regime did not reflect a general consensus on
priorities and distribution. If a deal stood, it was ‘’fair enough” for all practical purposes,
though not necessarily fair or just by any shared standard. This attribute of the sovereign
restructuring regime stands in contrast to domestic statutory bankruptcy’’.  In the
absence of a bankruptcy regime for states therefore, evaluations about inter-creditor
equity might be no less intractable than judgment calls on what one considers equal or
fair.  This “Foggy Status Quo” gives rise to inter-creditor battles in sovereign debt crises
that would be all too familiar to the eye of some 19th century lenders (Wynne, p. 141). 
Such battles, and their respective consequences for the sovereign debtor itself, beg the
question of the extend to which notions of inter-creditor equity developed in domestic
corporate reorganization regimes can shape what seems to be a rather amorphous
concept in the context of sovereign debt.
The Pari Passu Saga
What I am concerned with here is a particular understanding of inter-creditor equity
espoused in the (now infamous) case of NML v. Argentina. In this case, a group of hedge
funds led by NML Capital that had held out from the country’s 2005 and 2010 debt
restructuring agreements was successful in obtaining an equitable remedy by New York
courts to the effect of preventing the country from paying creditors that had voluntarily
reduced their claims as part of the previous two deals.  Importantly, the remedy
fashioned by New York courts was the result of Argentina’s violation of the pari passu
clause contained in the country’s sovereign bonds by virtue of servicing restructured
debt while at the same time remaining in default on the holdout claims and also passing
legislation prohibiting the government from settling these claims.
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In the realm of corporate debt, pari passu clauses constitute a contractual device to
safeguard inter-creditor equity by affirming the equal legal ranking of unsecured claims
on a forced distribution of the debtor’s available assets to unsecured creditors.  In that
sense, they make for a modest concept of inter-creditor equity with no guarantee of
actual equal treatment.  According to their generally agreed meaning (in both corporate
and sovereign debt), they do not require the debtor to pay all its debts pro rata and
without discrimination (see Wood, p. 85).  By requiring Argentina to do exactly that, US
courts stretched the notion of inter-creditor equity to its limits and well beyond its
traditional boundaries.
The Reorganization Analogy
The claim that NML v. Argentina was wrongly decided is certainly not novel.  What has
drawn less attention though is the more subtle point about the relation between the
overly ambitious concept of inter-creditor equity advanced therein with its
understanding in various other legal disciplines, most importantly that of corporate
insolvency law.  Normatively, this relation is not at all insignificant given the role of
domestic law in the development of international law through general principles of law
(but also customary law).  Of course, the reception of international law within a given
jurisdiction is in itself a convoluted and not always harmonious process.  At the very least,
however, an internationally accepted principle of inter-creditor equity would be relevant
in informing restructuring negotiations in a world without predetermined creditor
priorities such as that of sovereign debt.  More ambitiously, it could persuasively steer
the interpretation of pari passu clauses clear from the recent outcome in NML v.
Argentina.
The most obvious area from which parallels to sovereign insolvency could be drawn is
that of notions of inter-creditor equity found in domestic corporate reorganization
regimes.  Indeed, in this context inter-creditor equity has a rather flexible meaning, with
even pari passu creditors commonly receiving differentiated treatment according to the
terms of the debtor’s reorganization plan.  Under the most influential corporate
reorganization statute globally, chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s plan
will be sanctioned by the bankruptcy court if its terms do not discriminate “unfairly”
among different creditor classes.  Unfair discrimination is not defined in the code, but it
has been held that what it entails is differentiated treatment to similarly situated
creditors [in re AOV Industries, 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C.Cir. 1986)]. In practice, US bankruptcy
courts generally apply a permissive test to determine whether unfair discrimination has
taken place, thereby giving significant leeway to debtors in devising their reorganization
plan.  Elements of reasonableness, good faith and proportionality play a significant role in
their judgment.
The German Insolvency Statute on corporate reorganization largely draws upon the US
example.  Accordingly, reorganization plans providing for differentiated treatment
between creditor groups will be approved by the court if each group participates to a
reasonable extent in the economic value devolving on the parties under the plan (Section
245 (1) Insolvency Statute).  In addition, the court exercises an ex officio review of
procedural fairness and propriety regarding the plan’s approval (Section 250 Insolvency
Statute).
Under UK law, the protection of creditor minorities is generally stronger.  A creditor class
cannot be bound to the terms of a scheme of arrangement without its consent (courts do
not have so-called “cram-down” powers).  This reduces the ability of debtors to
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inter-creditor equity.  At the same time, however, UK courts have recognized that
minority creditors should not be given an effective veto over plans that would benefit the
creditor community as a whole by rehabilitating the debtor.  This is reflected in the
debtor’s capacity to group creditors in the same class for voting purposes as long as
creditors voting in the same class have a sufficient community of interest allowing them
to consult together with a view to their common interest (see here).  Therefore, the
power of the debtor company to decide on creditor class formation functions in practice
as a powerful tool against holdouts.  Courts will sanction a scheme of arrangement
between a company and its creditors if they are further satisfied that (i) the relevant
statutory requirements have been complied with; (ii) each class was fairly represented by
those attending the court meeting;  (iii) the statutory majority was acting bona fide in the
interests of the class; and (iv) it would be reasonable to approve the scheme.  With regard
to the reasonableness test, it is significant that relevant considerations include whether
the scheme was concluded after comprehensive negotiations with creditors and also the
degree of support that the scheme received from the majority of creditors.
… and its Limits
How far can then the analogy between corporate reorganization and sovereign debt
restructuring be extended?  One should certainly be careful about expectations.  If the
goal is to derive a fully operational concept of inter-creditor equity applicable to the
sovereign context, then the analogy is likely to disappoint.  Corporate reorganization laws
are different to sovereign debt workouts in many respects: most prominently, creditor
concessions in reorganization plans are not superimposed by the debtor but by creditor
majorities.  This has only recently become the trend in sovereign bonds governed by New
York law through the inclusion of collective action clauses.  Argentina could not rely on
such clauses, and the only way to restructure was to bet on the willingness of its
creditors (including NML) to voluntarily reduce their claims.  One could reasonably
question, however, the appropriateness of transferring the broad powers of corporate
debtors to devise reorganization plans following the approval of a majority of creditors to
a regime where creditor discretion is statutorily unfettered and only voluntarily limited
through contract, such is the case in sovereign insolvency.
Moreover, concepts of inter-creditor equity applicable to reorganization laws might be of
limited significance to the sovereign context for a different reason.  Corporate debt
structures are almost invariably much more complex than what is the case in the world of
sovereign debt.  Beyond differences on provisions regarding governing law, currency of
denomination or date of maturity, modern sovereign debt restructurings mostly involve
bondholders with largely similar instruments.  Any differences would most likely not
constitute grounds for separate classification under corporate reorganization law,
thereby limiting the rationale for differentiated treatment among the sovereign’s
creditors.  Structures of sovereign debt become complex because of the inclusion of
various types of official creditors, some of them pursuing separate agendas.  Corporate
reorganization laws have nothing to offer in addressing those challenges though.
Conclusion
Having said that, it would be also mistaken to ignore the experiences gained through the
practice of corporate reorganization on concepts of inter-creditor equity as valuable
insights in the realm of sovereign insolvency.  As previously mentioned, corporate
reorganization practice converges on debtors being given considerable leeway in devising
reorganization plans.  Differentiated treatment of even pari passu creditors is not per se
excluded.  Concerns regarding the viability of reorganization are paramount, even to the
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detriment of senior creditors.  Overall, inter-creditor equity is not a rigid concept but
rather subject to a criterion of fairness and reasonableness that allows for differentiated
treatment of differently situated creditors.  This was certainly not the view of judge
Thomas Griesa in the “trial of the century” in sovereign debt. In fact, the position on
inter-creditor equity in NML v Argentina was the very antithesis of its understanding as a
flexible and ultimately policy driven concept (the policy being the success of the
reorganization plan).  Following such an approach would have required heeding more
closely to the differentiation made by the Argentine government between participating
bondholders and holdouts as a policy option for achieving high participation in the debt
operation and restoring solvency.
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